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CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES 
Paul C. Giannelli 
Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University 
The witnesses' credibility or worthiness of belief is 
an important factor in most criminal trials. In some 
trials, it is the only issue; once the jury has decided 
which witnesses are credible and which are not, the 
question of guilt or innocence is easily reached. The 
common law, supplemented by various statutory 
enactments, has spawned numerous rules regulating 
the introduction of evidence of credibility. This article 
examines those rules. 
Typically, lawyers associate "credibility" with "im-
peachment" - attempts to diminish credibility. There 
are, however, important evidentiary rules regulating 
attempts to support credibility. For example, Ohio has 
rules governing "bolstering," attempts to support cred-
ibility prior to attack, as well as rules governing "re-
habilitation," attempts to support credibility after at-
tack. Thus, credibility may be viewed in three stages: 
bolstering, impeachment, and rehabilitation. 
BOLSTERING 
Generally, a party may not bolster or support the 
credibility of its witness until that credibility has been 
impeached. For example, a witness' favorable reputa-
tion for truth and veracity is not admissible in the ab-
sence of an attack. 
It is the general rule that a party cannot bol-
ster his witnesses by proving either specific 
instances of good character relative to truth 
and veracity or by demonstrating the witness' 
good general character and reputation for 
truth and veracity in the community before the 
witness is affirmatively impeached by the op-
posing party. State v. Schecter, 47 Ohio App. 
2d 113, 120-21, 352 N.E. 2d 617, 624 (1974), 
aff'd, 44 Ohio St. 2d 188, 339 N.E. 2d 654 
(1975). 
Similarly, prior consistent statements are inadmissible 
prior to attack. Ct. Cincinnati Traction Co. v. 
Stephens, 75 Ohio St. 171, 79 N.E. 235 (1906). (Even 
after attack such statements are not automatically 
admissible.) 
Public Defender: Hyman Friedman 
Two exceptions to the bolstering prohibition are 
especially important in criminal cases. First, a witness' 
in-court identification may be bolstered or corrobo-
rated by evidence of a prior out-of-court identification, 
whether it be a lineup, show up, or photographic dis-
play. State v. Lancaster, 25 Ohio St. 2d 83, 267 N.E. 
2d 291 (1971 ). Such corroborating testimony may be 
elicited from the eyewitness or from a third party who 
observed the identification. The prior identification is 
admissible only for bolstering purposes. The hearsay 
rule prohibits the substantive use of this evidence. 
Thus, a third party cannot testify about an out-of-court 
identification unless an in-court identification has first 
been made by the eyewitness. This evidentiary rule 
does not, of course, affect the constitutional require-
ments relating to the admissibility of pretrial identifica-
tions. See Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (right 
to counsel); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98 
(1977) (due process). 
The second exception concerns evidence of fresh 
complaint in rape and other sex offense trials. In an 
early case, Dunn v. State, 45 Ohio St. 249, 12 N.E. 
826 (1887), the Court held that once the alleged vic-
tim 
has been sworn and has testified, her decla-
rations in relation to the injury, made im-
mediately after it was inflicted, would be com-
petent in corroboration of her statements 
made in court ... [Such complaints] are as-
sumed to be the natural outburst of outraged 
feelings, and, if made at all, would naturally 
be made at the first opportunity, while the in-
jury is yet fresh and aggravating. /d. at 
250-52, 12 N.E. at 828. 
Accord, McCombs v. State, 8 Ohio St. 643 (1858); 
Johnson v. State, 17 Ohio 593 {1848). Again, evi-
dence of fresh complaint is admitted to bolster credi-
bility and is otherwise hearsay. /d. There are few re-
cent cases on fresh complaint, probably because 
most fresh complaints would also fall within a hearsay 
exception, either spontaneous exclamations or res 
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gestae, and would thus be admitted substantively. 
Nevertheless, there may be situations in which the 
complaint is delayed and thus would not fall within the 
hearsay exception, but would qualify under the bol-
stering rule because a "sufficient explanation" for the 
delay is offered. See State v. Crissman, 31 Ohio App. 
2d 170, 287 N.E. 2d 642 (1971 ). 
IMPEACHMENT: THE VOUCHER RULE 
Ohio follows the traditional view of prohibiting a 
party from impeaching its own witnesses. State v. 
Minneker, 27 Ohio St. 2d 155, 271 N.E. 2d 821 
(1971 ). The rule is based upon the theory that 
"[w]here a party calls a witness for examination he 
presents such witness to the court and jury as one 
whose testimony is to be relied upon ... " Thompson 
v. Kerr, 39 Ohio L. Abs. 113,120,51 N.E. 2d 742,747 
(1942). This rationale is not persuasive because "ex-
cept in a few instances such as character witnesses 
· or expert witnesses, the party has little or no choice of 
witnesses. He calls only those who happen to have 
observed the particular facts in controversy." C. 
McCormick, Evidence 75 (2d ed. 1972). 
There are several limitations on the voucher rule. 
Tl:le rule does not apply when the method of im-
peachment is specific contradiction; that is, when a 
second witness contradicts the testimony of a prior 
witness. State Auto Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Friedman, 34 
Ohio App. 551, 171 N,E. 419 (1929), aff'd, 122 Ohio 
St. 334, 171 N.E 591 (1930). 
.. The rule also does not apply if a party is "surprised" 
by !he witness' testimony. See State v. Springer, 165 
Ohio St. 182,134 N.E. 2d 150 (1956);Hurley v. State, 
46 Ohio St. 320, 21 N.E. 645 (1888}; State v. John-
son, 1120hio App. 124, 165 N.E. 2d 814 (1960). Ap-
parently there is a limitation on the surprise· rule. If 
·surprised, a party·may use a prior inconsistent state-
menfonly to refresh the witness' recollection. State v. 
Minneker, 27 Ohio St. 2d 155, 271 N.E. 2d 821 
(1971 ). Thus, while technically not permitting im-
peachment, the effect of the surprise rule is im-
peachment (not refreshment), if the witness refuses to 
repudiate the in-court testimony. 
The voucher rule also does not apply to court~called 
witnesses. Since the court, and not the parties, calls 
the witness, neither party has "vouched" for the wit-
ness' credibility. The Supreme Court has recently rec- · 
ognized the trial judge's power to call witnesses. See 
State v. Weind, 50 Ohio St. 2d 224, 235-36, 364 N.E. 
2d 224, 233 (1977). . . 
The validity of the voucher rule operating to prevent 
a criminal defendant from impeaching a witness is 
constitutionally suspect. In Chambers v. Mississippi, 
410 U.S. 284 (1973), the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that the combined effect of the state's voucher rule 
and hearsay exception on declarations against penal 
interests precluded the admission of critical and reli-
able defense evidence and thus violated due process. 
The Court's language leaves little doubt that in the 
appropriate case the voucher rule itself would violate 
due process: "The 'voucher' rule, as applied in this 
case, plainly interfered with Chambers' right to defend 
against the State's charges." /d. at 298. 
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Furthermore, proposed Ohio Rule of Evidence 607 
would abolish the voucher rule. 51 Ohio B. 191 
(1978}. Even if the Rules are never accepted by the 
General Assembly, the Court retains the power to 
modify the common law by decision, and proposed 
Rule 607 is evidence of the Court's inclination to do 
so. 
IMPEACHMENT: liNES OF ATTACK 
There are generally four lines of attack available to 
impeach: 
1. Bias or interest. 
2. Contradiction, either specific contradiction or 
self-contradiction. The former involves the use of 
another witness to contradict, while the latter in-
volves the use of the witness' own statements to 
contradict (prior inconsistent statements). 
3. Character for truth and veracity. There are sev-
eral ways to prove character, not all of which are 
recognized in Ohio: reputation, opinion, prior 
conviction, and specific acts not resulting in a 
conviction. 
4. Sensory or mental defects. 
At common law, a person's lack of belief in a Su-
preme Being disqualified the person as a witness. Ar-
ticle I, Section 7 of the Ohio Constitution prohibits the 
use of religious beliefs as a grounds for disqualifica-
tion. The use of religious beliefs as an impeachment 
method is also improper. See State v. Barger, 111 
Ohio St. 448, 453, 145 N.E. 857, 858 (1924); pro-
posed Ohio R. of Evid. 61 0; Fed. R. Evid. 61 0; C. ~ 
McCormick, Evidence§ 48 (2d ed. 1972}; 3 J. Wein- ~ 
stein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence ~ 61 0[01] 
(1977}. 
Impeachment evidence may be developed either 
(1) on cross-examination or (2) through extrinsic evi-
dence, testimonial or documentary. Some impeach-
ment techniques condition the admissibility of extrinsic 
evidence on the laying of a proper foundation during 
cross-examination. Other techniques prohibit the use 
of extrinsic evidence. Courts typically address this 
issue in 1\f~rms of_ "collateral matters," although the 
term is ra~ely defined. Extrinsic evidence on collateral 
matters is not permitted. 
BIAS OR INTEREST 
Bias as an impeachment technique has long been 
recognized in Ohio. R.C. 2945.42 provides: "Such in-
terest, ... or relationship may be shown for the pur-
pose of affecting the credibility of such witness." See 
also Powell v. Powell, 78 Ohio St. 331, 85 N.E. 541 
(1908); A/him v. State, 10 Ohio St. 287 (1859). 
There are two broad categories of bias: (1) relation-
ships between a witness and one of the parties, and 
(2) relationships between a witness and the litigation. 
A witness' relationship with one of the parties may be 
favorable, such as family, employment, business, and 
sexual relationships, or it may be hostile, thus creating 
a motive for revenge. The most important relationship 111 
between a witness and the litigation is a case in which '« 
a prosecution witness is offered immunity or a re-
duced charge in exchange for his testimony against 
the defendant. Such arrangements are always admis-
sibfe to show bias. See State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St. 
2d 167, 249 N.E. 2d 912 (1969}; Keveney v. State, 
109 Ohio St. 64, 141 N.E. 845 (1923). 
Evidence of bias or interest is never "collateral;" 
therefore extrinsic evidence is always admissible to · 
show bias. See Harper v. State, 106 Ohio St 481, 
140 N.E. 364 (1922). Moreover, curtailment of a 
defendant's efforts· to establish bias is unconstitu-
tional. In Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974}, the 
defense attempted to show that a key prosecution 
witness was a juvenile probationer and therefore had 
a motive - retention of his probationary status - to 
testify in a way favorable to the prosecution. The trial 
judge, based on a state statute, excluded the evi-
dence. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, finding a 
violation of the defendant's right to confrontation. 
Chief Justice Burger observed: 
The State's policy interest in protecting the 
confidentiality of a juvenile offender's record 
cannot require yielding of so vital a constitu-
. · tiona! right as the effective cross-examination 
for bias of an adverse witness./d. at 320. · 
See also Smith v. Illinois, 390 U.S. 129 (1968); Alford 
v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931 ). · 
PRIOR INCONSISTENT STATEMENTS 
Substantive Evidence. Ohio follows the traditional 
view in admitting prior inconsistent statements only for 
impeachment. Under this view, the prior statement is 
offered to show. the inconsistency. between the wit-
ness' trial and pretrial statements, and not to show the 
truth of the assertions contained in 'the pretrial state-
ment If offered tor the fatter purpose, the statement 
would be hearsay. McKelvey Co. v. General Casualty 
Co., 166 Ohio St.. 401, 142 N.E. 2d 854 (1957}; 
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v. McCune, 46 Ohio 
App. 291, 188 N.E. 568 (1933). 
·Inconsistency Requirement. To be admissible the 
prior statement must be inconsistent with the witness' 
trial testimony. The Ohio cases have adopted a liberal 
view of the inconsistency requirement. If the prior 
statement can be interpreted in either of two ways, 
only one of which is inconsistent with the trial tes-
timony, the statement is admissible. 
[If the prior statement] is susceptible of differ-
ent meanings, one of which would be incon-
sistent with the truth of such testimony, it is 
admissible in evidence, leaving the jury to de-
termine which is the true meaning ... Dilcher 
v. State, 39 Ohio St. 130 (1883). 
If the witness' testimony includes material facts that 
were omitted in the prior statement, the statement is 
inconsistent. Spaulding v. Toledo Consolidated St. 
Ry. Co., 20 Ohio Cir. Ct. 99 (1900). Moreover, if the 
witness claims a lack of memory or knowledge at trial, 
the prior statement is inconsistent. Blackford v. Kap-
lan, 135 Ohio St. 268, 20 N.E. 2d 522 (1939) (exclu-
sion of prior statement when witness testified "I don't 
know," "I don't remember," or "I don't believe so" is 
erroneous}. Criminal Rule 16 provides for the inspec-
tion of prior statements after the witness has testified 
on direct examination. 
Foundation Requirement. Ohio also follows the 
traditional view of requiring a foundation as a prere-
quisite for admitting the prior statement. 
.Before a witness can be contradicted by prov-
ing statements out of court at var:ance ·with 
his testimony, he must first be inquired of, 
upon cross-examination; as to such state-
ments, and the. time, place and person in-
volved in the supposed contradiction. King v. 
Wicks, 20 Ohio 87 (1851) (syllabus). 
Accord, Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426 (1884); Radke 
v. State, 107 Ohio St. 399, 140 N.E. 586 (1923). In 
State· v. Osborne, 50 Ohio St. 2d 211, 364 N.E. 2d 
216 {1977), the Ohio Supr~me Court recently held 
that a sufficient foundation had been laid by questions 
· attempting to refresh the witness' recollection about 
the prior statement. Whether Ohio follows the rule in 
Queen Caroline's case is a matter of dispute. 
Compare R. Markus, Trial Handbook for Ohio 
Lawyers 124 ( 1973), with Staff Notes, Proposed Ohio 
R. Evid. 613. Queen Caroline's rule requires a prior 
writtenstatement to be shown to the witness as part 
of the foundation. Proposed Ohio Rule 613 would 
abolish this ruie. See 51 Ohio B. 195 (1978}. 
Procedural Aspects. Once an inconsistent state-
merit is introduced, the witness is entitled to an oppor-
. tunity to explain the apparent inconsistency, Runyan 
v. Price, 15 Ohio St. 1 (1864), and the opposing 
counsel has the right to inspect the writing, Bluestein 
v. Thompson, 102 Ohio App. 157, 139 N.E. 2d 668 
(1957). If the witness admits making the prior state- · 
ment, it is not error for the trial court to refuse to admit 
the statement into evidence. Babbitt v. Say, 120 Ohio 
St.177, 165 N.E. 721 (1929);Dietsch v. Mayberry, 70 
Ohio App. 527,47 N.E. 2d 404 (1942). It is also prob-
ably not error for the trial court to admit the statement. 
In Dorsten v. Lawrence, 20 Ohio App. 2d 297, 253 
N.E. 2d 804 (1969), the court held that "after a proper 
foundation for impeachment has been laid for the in-
troduction of inconsistent statements of a witness, it 
becomes necessary to prove them." /d. at 305, 253 
N.E. 2d at 810. 
Collateral Matters. In addition to a proper founda-
tion, the prior statement must not relate to a "collat-
eral matter." If the statement does relate to a collat-
eral matter; extrinsic evidence is not permitted. 
Byomin v. Alvis, 169 Ohio St. 395, 159 N.E. 2d 897 
{1959); Kent v. State, 42 Ohio St. 426 (1884 ); Clinton 
v. State, 33 Ohio St. 27 (1877). The collateral matter 
rule only applies to extrinsic evidence; it does not pre-
clude inquiry on cross-examination so long as the in-
quiry is relevant to impeachment. The tests for collat-
eral matters and relevancy are not synonymous. AI~ 
though the early cases cite Attorney-Genera/ v. Hitch-
cock, 154 Eng. Rep. 38 (1847}, as the test for collat-
eral matters, it is probably accurate to say that the test 
for collateral matters in Ohio is not well-defined. For a 
discussion of this issue, see C. McCormick, Evidence 
§ 36 (2d ed. 1 972); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence 'If 607[06] (1977). 
Constitutional Issues. In Harris v. New York, 401 
· U;S. 222 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
statements obtained· in violation of the Miranda 
requirements could nevertheless be used for im-
peachm~nt. The Court r~affirmed and perhaps ex-
tendedHarris in Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714 
(1 975). See also State v. Lancaster, 25 Ohio St. 2d 
83, 267 N:E .. 2d ~91 (1 971 ). 
Ohio ~lso recognizes impeachment by prior incon-
sistent qCts. See Dilcher v. State, 39 Ohio St. 130, 
13§ (1883) ("ConduCt inconsistent with the testimony 
of a witness, may be shown as well as former state-
ments thus inconsistent.") The U.S. Supreme Court 
has Cllso had occasion to consider the application of 
Miranda and Harris to this method of impeachment In 
Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the Court held 
. thatthe·impeachme_nt us~ of Cl defendant's po~t~arr~st . 
S!l¢nq~ (conduCt) after receiving Miranda warnings 
VIolated dlle process. . .· . 
... C~lfi.r~~tir f:vide~c~~ - --·- ·- - . 
1he Ohio cases have recognized that a witness' 
character is relevant for impeachment purposes. See 
·Bucklin v; State, 20 Ohio 18 (1851); French v. Millard, 
2 Ohio St. 45 (1853); Cowan v: Kinney, 33 Ohio St. 
,122.(1878). Only the witness: charact~r for truth and 
veraCitY. and not his general character; is relevant. 
Schueler v. Lynam, 80 Ohio App. 325, 75 N.E. 2d 464 
(1947): ·In this context, character is used circumstan-
tiaHy: 
The theoiyunderlying the use of evidence of 
.· ''character or conduct forimpeathmenfpur-
. ·•· poses is that a person who possesses certain 
_inadequate character traits- as evidenced in 
a variety of ways including that he acted in a 
·particular way- is more prm1e than a person 
. ·whose character, in these. respects, is good, 
to testify untruthfully. It follow$ from this 
· --tiypefflesis that evidence Qf his bad character, 
· ·. or conduct is relevant to prove that he is lying. 
_ 3 J; Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evi-
····_ derice 608~8 {1977). · · · 
-.~character and reputation are not synonymous. 
"Character is a generalized description of one's dis-
position, or of one's disposition in respect to a general 
· trait .. .'_' C. McCormick, Evidence 462 (2d ed. 1972). 
· Reputation, on the other hand, is What a community 
collectively thinks about a person's character. Thus, 
reputation, along with opinion and specific acts, is a 
way of proving character. 
Character: Proof by Reputation.and 
OpinipnE:yidence 
· A witnes~:;: poor reputation for truth and veracity is 
a.dmissible for impeachment purposes. Cowan v. 
Kenney, 33 Ohio St. 422 (1878); Bucklin v. State, 2o' 
Ohio 18 (1851 ). The witness' reputation at the time of 
trial is the critical period. Radkev. State, 107 Ohio St 
399', 140 N.E. 586 (1923). The offering party musllay 
a _foundation establishing· the. impeaching witness' 
qualifications to express an opinion about the reputa-
tion in the community. Radke v. State, supra; State v. 
Rivers, 50 Ohio App. 2d 129, 361 N.E. 2d 1363 
(1977). The impeaching witness may also state 
whether he would believe the witness sought to be 
impeached under oath. Hillis v. Wylie, 26 Ohio St. 574 
(1875). 
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The use of opinion evidence to prove character, on 
the other hand, is prohibited. Bucklin v. State, supra; 
Cowan v. Kinney, supra. The general prohibition of 
opinion evidence has been criticized by the commen-
tators. See 7 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 1986 (3q ed. 
1940); C. McCormick, Evidence § 44 (2d ed. 1972). 
Proposed Ohio Rule 608(A), following the Fecferal 
Rules of Evidence, would permit opinion evide(1ce to 
prove charaCter. See 51. Ohio B. 191 (i 978). ' 
Character: Proof by Prior Conviction 
· Prior convictions are admitted . to impeach on the 
- theory that a conviction evidences a defect of ch-arac~ 
ter i:fna a person with such a charaCter defect is more 
likely tobe untruthful than a person without such a 
~-character; defect. The theory has· obvious flaws. A 
conviction for "driving whiie under the influence" re-
veals very little about a person's character for verac-
ity, although it. may reveal other things about that 
person's character. Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme 
Court in interpreting R.C. 2945.42, has held that any 
conviction; misd13meanor. or· felony, is admissible for 
impeachment purposes. State v. Murdock, 172 Ohio 
St. 221, 174 N.E. 2d 543 (1961 ). The Court has also 
held, however, that an ordinance violation is not a 
"crime" within the meaning of R.C. 2945,42 and thus 
cannot be used to impeach. $tate v. Arrington, · 42 
OhioSt.-2d H4~ 326 N.E. 2d 667- (1975);-Harpeiv. · 
State, 106 Ohio·st. 481,140 N.E. 364 (1922);Coble · 
v. State, 31 Ohio St. 100 {1876). Proposed Ohio Rule 
of Evidence. 609 suggests that the Court may be will-
ing to limit Murdock. Under Rule 609(A) mis-
demeanors would only be admissible if they involve 
"dishonesty or false s.tatements." In addition, Rule 
· 609(B) would generally preclude the use of convic-
tions over 10 years old. See 51 Ohio B. 192 (1978). 
Although Ohio has several expungement provisions, 
R.C. 2953.31-36, an expunged conviction niay 
nevertheless be used for impeachment. R.C. 
2953,$2{E). 
Jl!venile fi:djudications. The use of juvenile adjudi..: 
cat1ons as Impeachment evidence is controlled by 
R.C. 2151.358. It provides: 
The disposition of a child under the judgment 
rendered or any, evidence given in court is not 
admissible as evidence against the child in 
any other case or proceeding in any other 
court, except that the judgment rendered and 
the disposition of such child may be consid-
ered by any court only as to the matter of sen-
tence or to the granting of probation. 
Thus, j~venlle adjudications are generally inadmissi-
ble for Impeachment. There is, however, one impor-
tant exception. In State v. Cox, 42 Ohio St. 2d 200, 
327 N.E;. 2d 6.39 (1975), the Supreme Court held that 
the statute could not prevent a defendant from ini-
p-ead)ing a key government witness. . . 
Although the General Assembly may enact 
legislation to effectuate its policy of protecting 
the confiden,tiality of juvenile record;;, such 
· enactment ·may ncit impinge upon the right of 
a defendant in a criminal case to present all 
available, relevant and probative evidence · 
which is pertinent to a specific and material 
aspect of his defense. !d. at 204, 327 N.E. 2d 
at 642. 
See also Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974) 
Uuvenile probationary status admissible to show bias 
notwithstanding state statute). In addition to the im-
peachment exception recognized in Cox, the courts 
have permitted evidence of juvenile adjudications to 
be introduced to rebut evidence of good character. 
See State v. Marinski, 139 Ohio St. 559, 41 N.E. 2d 
387 (1942); State v. Hale, 21 Ohio App. 2d 207, 256 
N.E. 2d 239 (1969). 
Unconstitutional Convictions. In Loper v. Beta, 405 
U.S. 473 (1 972), the u~s. Supreme Court held that 
the impeachment use of a conviction in which the de-
fendant was denied the right to counsel violated due 
process. The right to counsel violation in Loper was 
based upon Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 
(1963). Gideon was subsequently extended in 
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). to any 
criminal trial in which imprisonment is imposed. This is 
an important development for a jurisdiction such as 
. Ohio which permits the use of misdemeanor convic-
tions. Once the validity of the prior conviction is 
raised, the prosecution has the burden of establishing 
that the right to counsel requirements were met. U.S. 
v. Lewis, 486 F. 2d 217 (5th Cir. 1973). · 
Indictments and Arrests. Evidence that a witness 
has been indicted or arrested may not be used to im-
peach if that evidence is offered only to show the wit-
ness' bad character. If, however, the impeachment 
theory is bias, such evidence would be admissible. 
See State v. Hector, 19 Ohio St. 2d 167, 249 N.E. 2d 
912 (1969); Kaveney v. State, 109 Ohio St. 64, 141 
N.E. 845 (1923). . 
Character: Specific Acts Not 
Resulting in a Conviction 
A person's conduct will reveal rnany aspects of that 
person's character. For example, a person who inten-
tionally falsifies an income tax return, a welfare appli-
cation, or some other document; has revealed some-
thing about his or her character for truth and veracity. 
If they are convicted tor these acts, the conviction 
may be used for impeachment. But may the act still 
be used to show the witness' character tor truth and 
veracity in the absence of a conviction? The Ohio 
cases are unclear. In a 1950 case, Fawick Airt/ex Co. 
v. United Elec., Radio & Machine Workers, 56 Ohio L. 
Abs. 419, 92 N.E. 2d 431 (1950), the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth District observed: 
It has long been the law of this state that a 
witness on cross-examination may be asked 
questions tending to disclose his own charac-
ter and may be interrogated on specific acts 
... in his past life if they have a legitimate 
bearing upon his credit as a witness. /d. at 
421, 92 N.E. 2d at 433. 
In 1974, however, the same court declared in State v. 
Schecter, 47 Ohio App. 2d 113, 352 N.E. 2d 617 
(1974), aff'd, 44 Ohio St. 2d 188, 339 N.E. 2d 654 
(1975): . 
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·A witness can never be impeached through 
evidence of specific instances of bad charac-
ter whether related to truthfulness or other-
wise. !d. at 121, 352 N.E. 2d at 624. . . 
Its 1950 decision was not mentioned, in:stead ·the 
court relied on Brice v. Samuels, 59 Ohio App. 9, 17 
N.E. 2d 280 (1938), a 1938 decision by the Court of 
Appeals for the First District. Brice held impeachment 
by specific instances of conduct on cross-examination 
improper: 
[W]e know of no rule under which specific 
acts of wrongdoing may be admitted to affect 
the credibility of a witness. /d. at 14, 17 N.E. 
2d at 282. 
Authority for a different rule from the First District, 
however, could have been found in State v. Brown-
ing, 98 Ohio App. 8, 128 N.E. 2d 173 (1 954), decid.ed 
in 1954. In Browning the First District overturned a 
conviction because the defensE) was not permitted to 
impeach a prosecution witness through instances of 
misconduct - episodes of drunkeness and false ac-
cusations: 
Evidence of ... habits of sobriety ... associ-
ations in life, similar accusations, and general 
habits in general could be quite pertinent as 
reflecting on [the witness'] credibility ... /d. at 
14, 128 N.E. 2d at 176. 
Moreover, the impeachment technique in Browning 
involved proof by extrinsic evidence as well as evi-
dence developed on cross-examination. Thus, there 
may be three different rules in Ohio: (1) specific in-
stances of conduct are inadmissible - Brice and 
Schecter; (2) specific instances of conduct may be 
raised on cross-examination ___,. Fawick Airflex Co.; 
and (3) specific instances may be proved by extrinsic 
evidence as well as raised on cross-examination -
Browning. Proposed Ohio Rule of Evidence 608(8) 
would permit specific instances to be raised oh 
cross"examination under certain circumstances. See 
51 Ohio 8; 191-92 (1 978). 
The impeachment rule on specific acts not resulting 
in a conviction should be distinguished from the rule 
governing the use of character evidence on the 
merits. A criminal defendant may introduce evidence 
of his good character in order to show that a person 
with such a character is unlikely to have committed 
the charged offense. Once the defendant has 
"opened the door," the prosecution may rebut by of-
fering evidence of the defendant's bad character. The 
prosecution, however, must generally use reputation 
evidence to prove character. Specific instances of 
conduct not resulting in a conviction are prohibited. 
State v. Cochrane, 151 Ohio St. 128, 84 N.E. 2d 742 
(1949). Prohibiting the use of specific acts in this con-
text does not necessarily mean that they are prohib-
ited in the impeachment context. Compare proposed 
Ohio R. Evid. 405(A), with proposed Ohio R. Evid. 
608(8). . 
Sensory or Mental Defects. 
This last impeachment category is extremely broad. 
Any deficiency of the senses, such as deaf-
. . 
ness, or color blindness or defect of other 
senses which would ~ubstantially lessen the 
atJility to- perceive the facts which the witness 
purports to have observed, should of course 
be provable to attack the credibility ofthe wit-
ness, either upon cross-examination or by 
producing other witnesses to prove the de-
fect. C. McCormick, Evide·nce 93 (2d ed. 
1972). 
The following Ohio cases are illustrative: Morgan v. 
State, 48 Ohio St. 371, 27 N.E. 710. (1891) (opportu-
nity to observe); Village of Shelby v. Clagett, 46 Ohio 
St. 549, 22 N,E . .407 (1889) (intelligence); Lee v. 
State, 21 Ohio St. 151 (1871) (recollection); Stewart 
v. State,, :If! (Jhio~02 (1850) (opportunity to observe); 
· Johnsonv. Knipp, 36 Ohio App. 2d 218, 304 N.E. 2d 
914 (1973) (intoxication); State v. Snell, 2 Ohio NP 
55, 5 Ohio Dec. 670 (1893) (age). · 
Impeachment: Expert Witnesses . 
· An expert witness may be impeached by the same 
methods used to impeach lay witnesses. E.g., Hoover 
v. State, 91 Ohio St. 41,109 N.E. 626 (1914) (expert 
impeached with prior inconsistent statement.) There 
is, however, one method of impeachment that applies 
only to expert Witnesses. A treatise recognized as a 
standard authority may be used for impeachment pur-
poses. See Piotrowski v. Corey Hospital, 172 Ohio St. 
61, 173 N.E. 2d 355 (1961 ); Hal/worth v. Republic 
Steel Corp;, 153 Ohio St. 349, 91 N.E. 2d 690 (1950); 
. Lambert .v. Dally, 30 Ohio App: 2d 36, 281 N.E. 2d 
857 (1972). The treatise is admissible only to test 
c:r~dit:li!ity, Cincl Jtc<:tnnot be used svbstantively. In ad-
dition, there is language in the Hal/worth opinion 
which would lirnit the use of learned treatises, even for 
impeachment purposes, to treatises acknowledged as 
standard works by the witness: 
If Dr. Kramer denied that he had known about 
this particular book, it is difficult to see how 
his further cross-examination with regard to 
the book would be proper at all. /d. at 356, 91 
N.E. 2d at 694. 
Propo'3ed Ohio Rule of Evidence 803(18), on the 
other h(lhd, carves out a hearsay exception for 
learned treatises as well as permits the reliability of 
the treatise to be established "by the. testimony or 
admission of the witness or by other expert testimony 
.or by judicial notice." 51 Ohio B. 200 (1978). 
Rehabilitation 
Once impeachment evidence has been introduced, 
rebuttal evidence tending to rehabilitate the witness' 
credibility may be admitted. The rebuttal evidence 
must respond to the impeaching evidence. 
. The rehabilitating facts must·meet a particular 
method of impeachment with relative direct-
ness. The wall, attacked at.one point, may not 
be fortified at another and distinct point. C. 
McCormick, Evidence 103 (2d ed. 1972). 
Once a witness' character for truth and veracity has 
been attacked, evidence tending to show that the wit-
ness enjoys a good reputation for truth and veracity is 
admissible. Webb v. State, 29 Ohio St. 351 (1876). 
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If the method of attack involves evidence of a prio1 
inconsistent statement, evidence of prior consistent 
statements are generally inadmissible. The theory un· 
derlying this rule is stated in Cincinnati Traction Co. v. 
Stephens, 75 Ohio St. 171, 79 N.E. 235 (1906): 
[Prior consistent statements] could not tend to 
reha,bilitate the damaged reputation of the 
witness for veracity, in any degree, to show 
that the witness had repeated a hundred 
times the later story which she now gave on 
. the trial. The contradiction still would remain, 
and it would remain unexplained, notwith-
standing the fact of repetition. /d. at 182, 79 
N.E. at 237. 
If, however, the prior statement is offered to rebut a 
charge of recent fabrication or improper influence, it 
may be admissible. See .C. McCormick, Evidence 1 05 
{2d ed. 1972); ct. proposed 0 hio R. Evid. 
801 (0)(1 )(b). See a/so She/lock v. Klempay, 167 Ohio 
St. 279, 148 N,E. 2d 57 (1958). 
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Motions in Limine 
The growing importance of motions in limine is high-
lighted by the addition at a new section on the subject 
in the 1978 pocket supplement to McCormick on Evi-
dence. C. McCormick, Evidence 17 (1978 Supp. 2d 
ed. 1972). See also State v. Spahr, 47 Ohio App. 2d 
221, 353 N.E. 2d 624 (1976); Rothblatt & Leroy, The 
Motion in Limine. iri Criminal Trials, 60 Ky. L.J. 611 
(1972); Davis, Motions in Limine, 16 Clev-Marshall L. 
Rev. 255 (1966). 
Law RevieWs 
. Comment, Shifting the Burden of Proving Self-
Defense - With Analysis of Related Ohio Law, 11 
Akron L. Rev. 717 (1978); Liability of an Aider and 
Abettor for Aggravated Murder in Ohio; State v. Lock-
ett, 39 Ohio St. L.J. 214 (1978); Note, the Sixth 
Amendment Right To Have Use Immunity Granted to 
Defense Witnesses, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1266 (1978); 
Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation 
and Compulsory Process Rights Against Statutory 
Communication Privileges, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 935 
(1978). 
Silence as Impeachment 
After _being .read his rights upon .arrest, the defend" 
ant made several statements to the police; he then 
refused to say more until he could talk to an attorney. 
At the defendant's trial for attempted murder, the 
prosecutor commented repeatedly on the defendant's 
post-arrest silence. A strong curative instruction to the 
jury was not given by the trial judge. The Court of Ap-
peals held that ··1 aln accused cannot be held to waive 
his Miranda nghts by beginning to speak.·· The 
prosecutor s questions and comments were improper 
and constituted plain error. State v. Bailey, No. 37534. 
Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. (1978). 
Theft Statute -Recidivist Provision 
Defendant was convicted of grand theft under R.C. 
2913.02 (B). That statute provides that a second theft 
conviction may be treated as grand theft, regardless 
of the value of the stolen property. At the time of trial, 
the defendant was awaiting sentencing for a prior theft 
offense. The Court of Appeals held that without a 
judgment of conviction setting forth the plea, the ver-
dict, and the sentence, signed by the judge and en-
tered upon the journal of the court, there had been no 
conviction within the meaning of the statute. Since 
there was no prior theft conviction, defendant's motion 
to reduce the charge against him to petty theft should 
be granted. State v. Henderson, No. 37316, 
Cuyahoga Cty. Ct. App. (1978). 
Waiver of Pre-sentence Psychiatric Examination 
During plea-bargaining, the defendant waived his 
right to a pre-sentence psychiatric examination under 
R.C. 2947.25. He was subsequently sentenced to the 
penitentiary. The purpose of R.C. 2947.25, according 
to the Court of Appeals, is to assist the trial court in 
determining whether to sentence an offender to a 
penal institution or to a hospital for treatment. "Neither 
the defendant, his trial counsel, nor the court is com-
petent to determine whether the accused is mentally 
ill or deficient. . . . [T]he examination is part of the 
sentencing process and may not be waived by the de-
fendant or his counsel." Thus, the lack of psychiatric 
examination invalidated the sentence. State v. Lee, 56 
Ohio App. 2d 57 (1977). 
Validity of Guilty Plea 
Under Ohio Grim. R. 11 (c)(2) a trial court must in-
quire as to whether a defendant voluntarily entered a 
plea of guilty with an understanding of the nature of 
the charge and of the consequences of his plea. Fail-
ure of the trial court to make these inquiries in full 
compliance with Grim. R. 11 (c)(2) is reversible error. 
State v. Hawk, 55 Ohio App. 2d 231 (1977). 
Motion for Acquittal 
When a jury is unable to reach a verdict in a crimi-
nal trial, the court may grant a motion of acquittal. In 
doing so, it should exercise judicial discretion, consid-
ering all matters which transpired during the trial and 
any other factors which may have influenced the jury. 
The court should also consider the probability that 
other juries would also be unable to agree. State v. 
Norwood, 55 Ohio Misc. 19 (1977). 
Breaking and Entering for Eavesdropping 
The Sixth Circuit disagreed with other federal cir-
cuits' interpretation of Title Ill. The Court rejected the 
arguments that Title Ill impliedly authorizes break-ins 
to install eavesdropping equipment, or that federal 
judges have inherent power to authorize such break-
ins. Breaking and entering affects property and per-
sonal interests, and "so aggravate the circumstances 
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of the search and go so far beyond what is encom-
passed in the scope of the eavesdrop statute. that an · 
eavesdrop executed in this manner is an unreasona-
ble search ... The Court held that no statute authorizes 
such conduct. and Article Ill of the Constitution and 
the reasonableness clause of the Fourth Amendment 
"prevent federal judicial and law enforcement officers 
from authorizing or engaging in such conduct in the 
absence of statutory authority ... U.S. v. Finazzo, 23 
Crim. L. Rep. 2501 (6th Cir. 1978). 
Warrantless Search of Suitcase 
A warrantless search of the defendants' suitcase, 
located on the floor of their automobile, was made at 
the time of arrest. The Eighth Circuit held that "an 
individual's expectation of privacy in the contents of 
luggage - which was established by the Supreme 
Court in [U.S. v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977] - is 
entitled to the protection of the Fourth Amendment 
whether the luggage is located inside or outside the 
automobile." The automobile exception to the warrant 
requirement does not apply to the facts of this case. 
Since the defendants were under arrest, a warrant 
was required for a search of their luggage. No exigent 
circumstances existed to waive this requirement. 
Therefore, marijuana found in the suitcase must be 
suppressed. U.S. v. Stevie, 23 Grim L. Rep. 2489 (8th 
Cir. 1978). 
Pretext Arrests 
Police used outstanding traffic warrants as a pretext 
to arrest a drug suspect. A subsequent search of his 
car turned up a bag of marijuana. The Court stated 
that "since a pretext arrest is per se illegal, evidence 
obtained as a result of that arrest is inadmissible." 
Thus, the marijuana should have been suppressed as 
the fruit of an illegal arrest. State v. Hoven, 23 Grim. 
L. Rep. 2464 (Minn. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
Warrantless Electronic Eavesdropping 
Although the warrantless electronic recording of a 
conversation in which .one party has agreed to be 
"bugged" is proper under the Fourth Amendment, 
U.S. v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971 ), it violates the 
Montana Constitution. "A state is free as a matter of 
its own law to impose greater restrictions on police 
activity than those that the United States Supreme 
Court holds to be necessary upon federal constitu-
tional standards." Article II, section 10, of the Montana 
Constitution provides that the right of individual pri-
vacy "shall not be infringed without the showing of a 
compelling state interest." Absent such showing, evi-
dence acquired through electronic monitoring must be 
suppressed. State v. Brackman, 23 Grim. L. Rev. 
2487 (Mont. Sup. Ct. 1978). 
Pretrial Incarceration Credit 
Prior to his trial for murder and attempted armed 
robbery, the defendant was incarcerated for six 
months because of his inability to post bail. He was 
sentenced to consecutive life and fifteen year sen-
tences. The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the 
equal protection clause requires that time spent in 
pretrial incarceration be credited to the time served on 
a life sentence to· determine eligibility for parole. 
Wilson v. State, 264 N. W. 2d 234 (Wis. 1 978). 
Nondisclosure of Material Evidence 
The defendant was tried and convicted of robbery. 
The prosecution failed to disclose, upon the defense'E 
request, that two of the state's eyewitnesses had ini· 
tially misidentified one of the robbers. The Court held 
that this information was material enough to raise a 
reasonable doubt in the jury's minds, as to both the 
witnesses' trial identification of the defendant and the 
strength of the state's case. This nondisclosure of 
material evidence denied defendant a fair trial. State 
v. Falkins, 356 So. 2d 415 (La. 1 978). 
Prejudicial Remarks by Prosecutor 
In his closing summation to the jury, the prosecuting 
attorney expressed his own personal opinion about 
the defendant's guilt. These remarks were found to be 
prejudicial and may have denied the defendant a fair 
trial. The statements could have constituted grounds 
for a mistrial if defendant's counsel had objected. De-
fense counsel's failure to object amounted to ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, and therefore a new trial 
was granted. Commonwealth v. Evans, 387 A.2d 854 
(Pa. 1 978). 
Severance 
The trial court had been notified of a potential con-
flict between the two defendants. The conflict de-
veloped as the defendants presented their cases, 
prejudicing both defendants. The Court of ·Appeals 
held that when the rights of at least one of the defen-
dants will be prejudiced by a joint trial and the trial 
court has notice of the conflict, denial of a motion to 
sever is prejudicial error. People v. Webb, 266 N.W 
2d 483 (Mich. Ct. App. 1 978). 
Speedy Trial 
There was a twenty-two month delay between the 
defendant's arrest and the preliminary hearing, and 
another five-month delay between the hearing and 
trial. None of the delay was attributable to the defen-
dant. Moreover, he objected to every continuance 
sought by the state, and made a timely assertion of 
his right to a speedy trial. The burden is on the state 
to show that any delay is justifiable. Defendant's fail-
ure to make an evidentiary showing of prejudice to his 
defense does not destroy his claim. "Finding that his 
claim was timely asserted, that the delay was inordi-
nate, and that the delay was justified by no constitu-
tionally sufficient reason, we hold that defendant was 
denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial." 
Fowlkes v. Commonwealth, 240 S.E. 2d 662 (Va. 
1 978). 
False Affidavit 
The U.S. Supreme Court has refused to suppress 
evidence obtained through a search warrant issued 
upon a false affidavit, unless the misstatements are 
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intentional and would affect probable cause. Franks v. 
Delaware, 98 S. Ct. 2674 (1 978). The California Sup-
reme Court, interpreting its own constitution, has 
reached a different result. Evidence should be sup-
pressed whenever a false statement is deliberately in-
cluded in the affidavit, whether or not the statement 
was necessary to the finding of probable cause. 
People v. Cook, 24 Grim. L. Rep. 2004 (Cal. Sup. Ct. 
'1978). 
Stipulation May Require Rule 11 Inquiry 
The defendant originally pled guilty, but his plea 
was denied when the trial judge discovered that the 
defendant was not satisifed with his counsel. Later, 
after pleading not guilty, the defendant stipulated to 
facts which were "tantamount to a guilty plea." On 
appeal, the· Court held that when a defendant stipu-
lates to facts which are in effect an admission of guilt, 
the trial court must ensure that the defendant under-
stands the consequences. However, since defendant 
had been carefully questioned in a Rule 11 procedure 
earlier in the trial, his appeal was denied. Glenn v. 
U.S., 23 Grim. L. Rep. 2562 (D.C. Cir. 1 978). 
Illegal Stop Taints Consent 
Police officers stopped and detained the defendant 
without probable cause. During his detention the de-
fendant consented to a search of his car. As a result 
the police discovered a quantity of marijuana. The 
Court held that the marijuana should be suppressed 
because the illegal stop and detention fatally tainted 
the defendant's consent. State v. Wrightson, 23 Grim. 
L. Rep. 255 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1 978). 
Victim's Character 
The Connecticut Supreme Court has adopted the 
majority rule that a homicide victim's violent character 
may be used to support a self-defense claim that the 
victim was the aggressor. The Court further held that 
prior convictions for violent crimes could be used to 
prove the victim's character. Such evidence may be 
used even if the defendant knew nothing of the 
victim's violent character at the time of the incident. 
State v. Miranda, 24 Grim. L. Rep. 2008 (Conn. Sup. 
Ct. 1978). 
Right to Confrontation of Experts 
Defendant was denied his right of confrontation 
when a medical report, in which five of six psychia-
trists declared him "competent," was admitted into 
evidence. Only two of the five doctors subsequently 
testified at trial. "This was critical evidence of a tes-
timonial nature, pertaining directly to appellant's ulti-
mate 'guilt', that could, and should, have come viva 
voice- from the mouths of the witnesses in court, 
where, under the watchful eye of the jury, they could 
have been cross examined .. . "Gregory v. State, 24 
Grim. L. Rep. 2014 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1 978). 
